INTRODUCTION
Most of the literature on electoral competition focuses on the study of static models. Parties decide strategically which policy to advocate in order to win the election. Voters decide which party they like best and the model typically only attempts to predict the elections' outcome. While models of this type capture some of the important features of party competition, they ignore some others. In reality, elections are repeated over time. The dynamic nature of the process changes both the circumstances under which elections are held and the voters' preferences. Finally, it introduces a distinction between a candidate and her party as separate decision makers who may have different goals. This paper presents a simple model of three-party competition, focusing on these aspects. For simplicity and clarity of exposition we ignore many of the standard aspects of party competition that are widely studied in the literature.
Since voters delegate the choice of a policy to parties, the choices available to the voters are the parties. The decision of the voters should be based on their available information about parties. In a dynamic setting, we consider past performance of the parties while in office as the most reliable information that is readily available to the voters.
We model the fact that in reality, voters often express dissatisfaction with the parties. Numerous studies of impression formation have found that negative information is weighted more heavily than positive information as impressions of others are formed. This tendency is known as the negativity effect. There are two different explanations of the negativity effect in political behavior. The perceptual "figure-ground" theory proposes that the negativity effect occurs because negative actions are contrasted against the generally positive expectations of presidential candidates' behavior. The "cost orientation" explanation argues that people are risk oriented and motivated to avoid loss. Several empirical studies have shown the importance of the negativity effect in political behavior (Kernell (1977 ), Lau (1982 and 1985 , Klein (1991) . For a survey, see Aragones (1997) ).
As in Aragones (1997) , our model assumes that it is dissatisfaction, rather than satisfaction that drives voters' choices; that is, voters vote against rather than for parties. Hence the record that voters keep of the parties reflects how much they disliked them rather than how much they liked them, and this record is updated every time that a new party takes office. Further, voters' dissatisfaction accumulates over time. Formally, elections take place at periods t = 0,1,2,... Before each election voters update their evaluations of the parties by including the results of last election, given by the last party in office ( p t ) and the policy it chose to implement ( x t ). We can write the decision rule of voter i as maximizing: Since elections take place over time, we have to deal with the fact that candidates and parties have different "life" horizon. While candidates typically cannot be reelected forever, parties can. Thus it is natural to make a distinction between candidates and parties with respect to their objective functions. Since candidates cannot be reelected over and over again, they behave myopically. It is assumed that the objective of the candidates while in office is to maximize the proportion of votes that their party will get in next election 1 . Parties, on the other hand, care about the future and they try to maximize the number of times they will be in office over time. Candidates may be viewed as players in a one period game, whereas parties -as players in an infinite period one. We will see that the different objectives of parties and candidates are compatible. Furthermore, the choices that candidates make while in office result in the formation of different ideologies for different parties.
For simplicity we assume that the choices of parties and candidates are given by the set 0,1 { }. It may be interpreted as follows: given a position of the economic variables, the performance of a party in office for one period can decide 1 Since in this model voters base their decision on parties' past performance, the only relevant decision of parties and candidates is the policy they implement after they have been elected. Platforms do not have any effect on the voters' choice and therefore are omitted. the direction in which the economy is going to move but cannot position the economy in a point of the state space far away from the original one (status quo). Grofman (1985) analyzes the relationship of this policy space with the standard one. As an example, policies of type 0 can be thought of as "to cut taxes" or "protectionist policies" or "decrease public expenditure" and policies of type 1 as "to raise taxes" or "nonprotectionist policies" or "increase public expenditure" respectively. The model can also apply to any other kind of policy, for instance, to increase or decrease aid to fledgling democracies.
The properties that characterize the electoral system in the present model are the following: each voter has a single vote to cast and there is a single-winner elected under plurality rule. Given the decision rule of the voters we have sincere voting and, because our voters do not consider the possibility of abstention, all votes are to be cast. There is a continuum of voters with "ideal points" uniformly distributed on the interval 0,1 [ ]. (An "ideal point" reflects a voter's preferences fro the frequency with which policy 1 is implemented.) The number of parties is exogenous and the main results are given for a three party competition. Parties do not have ideal points to begin with. These are endogenously determined by maximizing their objective functions. Each party presents one candidate for each election. Therefore there is no need for platforms: voters make their decision based on past performance alone. The winner of the election has to choose a policy to implement in the set 0,1 { }. Since candidates cannot be reelected forever, they maximize the proportion of votes stagewise. Parties, on the other hand, care about the future and maximize the limit frequencies of the number of times they win.
Aragones (1997) studies a similar model with two party competition. It shows that parties that only try to maximize the number of votes at each election, behave as if they had ideal points in the policy space (ideologies). In the present paper we focus on three party competition 2 for three reasons: first, to test the robustness of these results; second, to study the relationship between the policy space and the number of different "ideologies" that may emerge; and lastly, to study the effect of a party splitting into two formally distinct parties.
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Although most of the literature on party competition focuses on the two-party case, in modern democracies there are many examples of multiparty competition. In Canada, two major parties together typically receive more than three quarters of the votes and a third party receives most of the remainder. India has a multiparty system with a dominant party. Even in the United States, the presence of a third party often interrupts the usual competition between Democrats and Republicans.
Equilibrium analysis for three-party competition yields the following predictions: the status quo (aggregate of policies implemented over time) converges to the median voter's ideal point and the policies chosen by the candidates characterize the ideology of the party to which they belong. The results for the two-party case should become clear from this derivation. In the concluding remarks we also suggest some conjectures about the results of competition among a larger number of parties.
First we present a solution of the candidates competition that relies on the assumption that candidates are loyal in the following sense: when they are indifferent between policies of type 0 and 1 they will choose the policy that the party has chosen in the past (this will turn out to be well defined). In this case the solution shows that no party mixes policies of different types, i.e., if a party starts choosing a policy of type 1 it will continue choosing this type of policy for ever (Theorem 1). Then we drop the assumption of loyalty and in the long run we have a similar result (Theorem 2), i.e., in the first periods one of the parties may switch between the two types of policies but at some point it chooses one of them and continues with the chosen one for ever. In both cases, it is in the interest of each party to have no other party choosing the same type of policy it has decided to implement. The two solutions described above yield the same results for the long run: one of the parties chooses one type of policy and wins one half of the time and the other two parties choose policies of the other type and each wins one fourth of the time. Since we assume that parties have no ideal point to begin with, this result can be interpreted as suggesting that ideologies may emerge from the actions of the candidates when maximizing the popularity of the party in the short run. This result is corroborated by evidence. Empirical studies lend support to the claim that Democrats and Republicans have different effects on the economy while in office. Hibbs (1977) , Beck (1982), and Chappel and Keech (1986) show the different effect on the unemployment rate. Alesina and Sachs (1988) and Tabellini and La Via (1989) show that republican administrations have been associated with tighter monetary policies. Frey and Schneider (1978) found that conservative presidents tend to restrict expenditures. The point we would like to emphasize is that these ideologies need not be assumed as primitive; they may simply result from the parties' attempt to differentiate themselves from others.
Thus, the three party model suggests the following conclusions. First, the emergence of ideologies is not an artifact of the two party model. Second, the number of "ideologies" seems to depend on the policy space, rather than on the number of parties; despite the parties incentive to differentiate themselves from each other, no party in our model chooses to appear as "moderate," and they all choose some "extreme." Finally, our results seem to explain Duverger Law: when the policy space consists of only two points, there is "no room" for a third party.
In the solutions described above we have considered candidates as the players of the game at each stage. If parties instead of candidates were to decide on policies, their objective would be to maximize the number of times that the party wins, i.e., they would take into account that they are going to participate in all elections and so they would prefer to sacrifice some of the votes in a given period in order to increase the total number of times in office. We show that if candidates are stagewise vote-maximizers and loyal, their choices constitute a Nash equilibrium path in the infinite-stage game. In the model we present we have that even in the case that candidates were completely responsible for the choice of policies, their choices would not conflict with their parties' long-run objectives. Furthermore, the resulting choice of policies over time characterizes
the party by what we have called emergence of ideologies: in equilibrium parties are identified with a certain type of policy. Thus, the competition of myopic candidates that behave independently of the party label assigned to them gives as a result the characterization of political parties by an ideology.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 relates the present model to the existing literature. Section 3 describes formally the model. In section 4 we present the results. Section 5 includes some concluding remarks.
RELATED LITERATURE.
There exist some theories of voting which suggest that voters base their decision on past performance of the parties. The Reward-Punishment theory proposed by Key (1966) is based on the assumption that voters only care about the effects of the policies that parties choose and they are looking at past performance when deciding how much confidence to give to each party. Downs (1957) proposed a theory according to which parties' past performance is the cheapest way for voters to predict future performance. In this model, voters care about the policy that a party implements on top of its effects. He assumes that political parties must be consistent over time in the policies they advocate and implement. Our interpretation of the voters' behavior is different from Downs' but we find that consistency over time in the policies implemented is a result of optimal choice of the parties. Fiorina (1981) builds a dynamic model for two parties that combines features of both theories and examines it at the empirical level. He assumes that voters base their decision not only on past performance of the parties but also on past promises and hypothetical choices of policies. He shows that most of the assumptions of his theory are supported by the data. Our model is much simpler than Fiorina's. Past promises or hypothetical choices are not considered by the voters in their evaluation of the parties. For simplicity we also assume that platforms have no effect on the evaluation of the parties.
Other variations of retrospective voting have been suggested in analyzing how voters ought to behave if they wish to get their representatives to pursue their interests. The solution is an optimal decision rule for the voters given that they know the objective function of the parties. Ferejohn (1986) and Austen-Smith and Banks (1989) are two examples. In our model, we assume that voters use very little information to make their decision. They do not know the objectives that define parties' behavior and they use a very simple rule to evaluate parties based on past performance. Even though the decision rule of the voters uses all the information in the voters' memory about past performance of the parties, at each point of time a voter only has to remember one number for each party, which represents the evaluation of the party by the voter. After he has seen the performance of a party while in office, the voter updates his evaluation of this party by adding a number to his previous evaluation.
Kramer (1977) presents a dynamic model of two-party competition whose main assumptions are the following: parties maximize votes myopically; the preferences of the voters are constant over time and are defined on the policy space; at any time the challenger can choose any policy in the policy space while the incumbent must defend the same policy. One of his results is that the challenger always has a strategy that defeats the incumbent, therefore parties alternate in office. Without restricting the actions of the party in office our model also shows that most of the time the challengers can defeat the party in office.
THE MODEL
We assume there is a continuum of voters. 
It will simplify notation to define the infinite period game for the parties and embed the candidates' game in it. That is, instead of defining the candidates' game as a game with infinitely many stagewise vote-maximizer players we will model them as agents of the parties, and reflect their utility maximization by an appropriate choice of strategies for the parties.
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Notice that this decision rule is equivalent to the one presented in the introduction. It has been suggested by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993 
We use for concatenation. A strategy for party p is defined by
{ } is a function that assigns to each history a policy x ∈ 0,1 { }. We consider the following two sets of strategies: the set of vote maximizing strategies
and its subset of loyal strategies
First, we analyze the behavior of the candidates as autonomous agents in the game. At each election t we have a different candidate for each party. The candidate of the winning party has to choose a policy. We assume that at each time t , the candidate that wins the election, implicitly assumed to know the decision rule of the voters, chooses a policy in the set 0,1 { } to maximize the proportion of votes that she can obtain in the next election (stagewise vote-maximizer I. For all t = 4k, k = 1,2,...
(All proofs are relegated to an appendix.)
Part I of the theorem states that, under the above assumptions, parties will always choose the same type of policy. In this case, we have that for all t = 4k parties a and b , which have been choosing policies of type 0, win one fourth of the time and party c , which has been choosing policies of type 1, wins one half of the time.
Part II concludes that in the long run the limit frequencies of the time in office for the parties are as follows: party c , who has been choosing only policies of type 1, wins one half of the time and parties a and b , who have chosen only policies of type 0, win one fourth of the time each.
Next we drop the loyalty assumption. We still assume that at each time t , the candidate that wins the election, implicitly assumed to know the decision rule of the voters, chooses a policy in the set 0,1 { } to maximize the proportion of votes that she can obtain in the next election (stagewise vote-maximizer 
Theorem 2 states that two of the parties will always choose the same type of policy, regardless of how the third party chooses to mix the policies. That is, two of the parties are behaving as if they were loyal, while the third one is "almost" loyal: it will choose the same policy whenever in power, except for at most three times.
In one fourth of the time each. At any rate, the long-run frequencies are as specified in Theorem 1; however, in case one party mixes the two types of policies, it cannot be the one that wins one half of the times.
Finally, we consider the case of competition of parties. As explained in the introduction, stagewise maximization characterizes the objective of the candidates. Since candidates cannot be reelected, they only care about their popularity one period ahead. In contrast, parties participate in elections at all periods. Therefore the objective of the parties can be characterized by the maximization of the limit frequency of the number of times that the party is in candidates whose sole objective is to win the election will not have any incentive to deviate from the ideology that characterizes the party they belong to.
If we define the economic configuration or status quo at time t , e t , as
the ratio between the number of times that type 1 policies have been chosen in the past and the total number of elections we find that, in both cases, the economic configuration tends to stabilize at one half, that is, in the limit both policies have been chosen the same number of times. This result reflects the fact that parties tend to satisfy the median voter in some sense. To be precise, on the aggregate level there is some support to Hotelling's result. On the other hand, if we consider the aggregate economic variable when each party is in power, it tends to one half for all parties. However, this is a result of aggregation over time, taking into account the cumulative effect of past elections. By contrast, when we focus on each party's decision variable, i.e., whether to lead the economy to the "left" or "right" end of the state space we find the opposite of Hotelling's result of minimum differentiation, i.e., that parties are pushed to one of the extreme policies ("always right" or "always left"). Notice that the economic configuration is only a measure of the aggregate effects of the policies implemented and has no strategic implications. 
Thus, party a will choose policy 0, because it is the policy it has already chosen in the past.
At t = 4k + 1 we have: 
( ), i.e., party b chooses policy 0.
At t = 4k + 2 we have:
4k + 2 which implies that party c wins this election and c
( ), i.e., party c chooses policy 1.
At t = 4k + 3 we have: 
Case 2.-If party c wins the election at time t = 4k we have:
i.e., party c will choose policy 1.
At t = 4k + 1 we have: ( ) = 0 . Thus, party a chooses policy 0 because it is the policy it has already chosen in the past.
which implies that party b wins this election and b
At t = 4k + 3 we have:
4 k +3 which implies that party c wins this election and c
At t = 4 k + 1 ( ) we have:
Proof of Theorem 2:
Part I : first we prove ii ( ) by induction on k . Assume that at t = 4k we have k 1 = k and k 2 = 0 . At t = 4k + 1 we have: 
( ) , i.e., party b chooses policy 0.
Now suppose that at t = 4k party c has won the election. From the previous proof we know that it chooses policy 1.
At t = 4k + 1 we have: At t = 4k + 2 we have:
4 k +2 which implies that party b wins this election and b
At t = 4k + 3 we have: At t = 4 k + 1 ( ) we have:
which proves the result for k 1 = k and k 2 = 1. Similarly it can be proven for k 1 = 1 and k 2 = k . Now suppose that it is true for k 1 > 1 and k 2 > 1 and k 1 + k 2 = k .
At t = 4k we have:
Case 1.-Suppose that party a wins the election at t = 4k . Then
Case 1.1.-If at t = 4k party a chooses policy 0. Then at t = 4k + 1 we have:
Therefore a
At t = 4k + 2 we have: 
( ) i.e., party c chooses policy 1.
( ) , i.e., party c chooses policy 1.
which implies:
Therefore a 
At t = 4 k + 1 ( ), for all possible results of Case 1.1. we have:
Case 1.2.-If at t = 4k party a chooses policy 1 then at t = 4k + 1 we have:
By a similar argument we can prove that at t = 4 k + 1 ( ) we have:
Case 2.-Suppose that party b wins the election. Then b
i.e., party b chooses policy 0.
Case 2.1.-If at t = 4k + 1 party a chooses policy 0 then at t = 4k + 2 we have: 
and c 4k +3
= k 1 + 1 3k 1 + 2 which implies that party c wins and
Case 2.2.-If at t = 4k + 1 party a chooses policy 1 then at t = 4k + 2 we have: 
Case 3.-Suppose that party c wins the election. Then, using an argument symmetric to case 2 we obtain the same results.
By combining the different cases we conclude that if a party mixes the two policies (because, given that candidates are stagewise vote-maximizers, they are indifferent between 0 and 1), eventually it will decide for one of them (candidates are no longer indifferent) and will continue choosing this same policy forever. This result is represented in Figure 1 , for every strategies of its opponents.
Since in this case the limit frequency of party c is already one half, it does not have any incentive to deviate.
Proof of Remark:
Suppose that the winners of the first three elections are a,b and c respectively. Assume that parties a and b are stagewise vote-maximizers. Suppose that parties a and b have chosen policy 0 the first time they took office (it is stagewise maximizing). Further, suppose that they choose the following (stagewise maximizing) strategy for t > 2 : if it is indifferent between the two policies in terms of stagewise maximization then it will choose the policy that party c chose at t = 2 (the third election). In this case we have that x a ∈ X a and x b ∈ X b . Given the strategies of parties a and b , it pays to party c not to maximize next election votes the first time it takes office (by choosing policy 1) in order to make sure that its limit frequency of times in office will be one half.
If at t = 2 and t = 3 party c uses a stagewise maximizing strategy it will choose policy 1, since parties a and b have chosen policy 0. At t = 4 there is a tie among the three parties. If parties a (or b ) wins this election it will be indifferent between policies 0 and 1 in terms of vote maximization and it will choose policy 1 and from then on we will have the following result:
parties a and c choose always policy 1 and win one fourth of the times each and party b chooses always policy 0 and wins one half of the times. If at t = 4 party c wins the election then at t = 5 party a (or b) will win and we will have the situation described above.
If at t = 2 party c chooses policy 0, instead of a vote maximizing policy, at t = 3 there is a tie among the three parties. If party a (or b ) wins the election it will be indifferent and will choose policy 0, imitating party c at t = 2 . If the next time that party c wins an election it chooses policy 1 then the result will be as follows: parties a and b choose always policy 0 and win one fourth of the times each and party c chooses always policy 1 and wins one half of the times.
